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TECHNOLOGY'S LATEST MARKET MANIPULATOR? HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING: THE STRATEGIES, TOOLS, RISKS, AND
RESPONSES
Tara Bhupathi
The development of high frequency trading technology has created
significant controversy in the financial markets, especial/y in light of the
increased use of tools such as naked access, flash orders, and co-
location. This recent development argues that the SEC is correct in both
banning naked access, because it increases risk of market detriment, as
well as eliminating flash orders, due to their potential to aid in market
manipulation. Further, the SEC's lack of regulatory response to high
frequency trading and co-location should be maintained. Since neither
mechanism presents a risk of market detriment or manipulation on its
own, and both seem to be criticized solelv because they break from
traditional market fndamentals, it would unnecessarilv sti/le
technological development to insist on banning or minimizing the use qf
these strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
It's the summer of 1945, and Luise, a college student, interns
for the New York Stock Exchange. Her job is to answer the
telephone and handwrite the caller's trade requests. This
information is then passed, via messenger, to a trader who
eventually completes the transaction. Sixty-five years later, Bill, a
software engineer with a Ph.D. in computer science, works for a
small hedge fund that specializes in United States equity trading.
His job entails figuring out how to decrease the amount of time it
takes his trades to confirm-in microseconds.
Luise and Bill's contrasting experiences offer a historied
perspective of technology's impact on financial markets. Rapid
technological advances have affected every aspect of society,
causing the legal world to either choose to judicially adapt old laws
and policies to the new digital situations or to legislatively create
J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2011.
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new doctrines to deal with unforeseen challenges.' This Recent
Development studies the decision of whether to create new
regulations as the current "technological arms race"2 rages in the
financial markets, creating innovative trading strategies and tools.
Some fear a continued lack of regulation will allow for market
manipulation, an unfair advantage for those with enhanced
technology, and potential doomsday.' While these concerns are
legitimate with respect to strategies which side-step necessary risk
management oversight, more information is needed before
regulations are warranted on the other newly developed methods
and mechanisms which do not present imminent market risk.
This Recent Development focuses on the two major effects
technology has historically had on the markets: (1) increased risk
of market detriment and (2) erosion of the fundamental principles
of the market system. Part I provides a historical background of
the relationship of technology with the financial markets and the
relevant regulations. Part II serves as an introduction to current
controversial strategies and tools: high frequency trading, flash
orders, naked access, and co-location. Part III discusses the legal
issues associated with these developments and the response of the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") and individual
exchanges. Finally, Part IV argues that regulatory responses to
new strategies and tools should vary depending on the perceived
'See generall' ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAw 25-26 (West 2d ed.
2009) (comparing the view that "'computer-specific' ... criminal statutes
[would be] unnecessary, imprecise, clumsy, over-inclusive, or ineffective" with
the view that new statutes should be created to "minimize the risk of an overly
expansive law that could chill innovation and technological development").
2 Laurence Fletcher, BlueCrest Spends Big on Rapid-Trading "Arms Race"
REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5Bi 1212009
1202 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
3See Edward Kaufman, Preventing a Horror Movie Ending in the US
Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
9d234948-ba3 1-11 de-9dd7-00144feab49a.htmi (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); see also Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find
Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, at Al & A 17, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html (noting that
Senator Kaufman, a staunch critic of the various technologies that have
developed recently, has urged the SEC to, at the very least, monitor the growth
and begin proposing regulations).
378 [Vol-. 11: 377
High Frequency Trading
impact on the market. Specifically, while immediate bans are
warranted to prohibit technology that increases risk of market
failure, regulation of mechanisms that aid in market manipulation
or that negatively impact liquidity and efficiency must first be
justified through comprehensive and conclusive evidence of
causation. Further, technology charged with affecting market
fundamentals, such as long-term investor primacy' or the specialist
system,' must not be restricted merely due to the traditionalists'
desire to stunt market evolution in an increasingly technologically
advanced world.
[[. BACKGROUND
On January 21, 2010, the SEC issued a concept release'
seeking comments and suggestions from the public regarding
equity market structure.' One major concern highlighted in the
release is high frequency trading, with the SEC seeking
information on the new trading strategy, the tools associated with
it, and the perceived risks involved with its use.' Before further
discussing high frequency trading, it is helpful to provide a focused
look into technology's impact on the securities market since the
4 Long-term investors are "market participants who provide capital investment
and are willing to accept the risk of ownership in listed companies for an
extended period of time." Concept Release on Equity Market Structure,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.613.58, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3603 (Jan. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter Concept Release] (noting that the SEC "particularly focuses on the
interests on long-term investors").
The specialist system refers to the traditional "manual trading floors and
[over-the-counter] market makers that trade directly with customers." Id. at
3607.
6 The concept release is a request for "public comment on a wide range of
market structure issues, including high frequency trading . . . . The Commission
intends to use the public's comments to help determine whether regulatory
initiatives to improve the current equity market structure are needed and, if so,
the specific nature of such initiatives." Id. at 3594.
7Id.
See infra Part Ill.A.
Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3606-12.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")o created the
SEC," and secondary market regulation commenced.
A. Evolution of Market Technology
Historically, the purpose of securities regulation has been to
form effective, fair, and honest markets. 2  In line with these
values, two developments since the Exchange Act have had a
significant impact on the evolution of today's technologically
advanced markets. First, Congress directed the SEC to create and
maintain a national market system through the 1975 Amendments
to the Exchange Act ("the 1975 Amendments")." The purpose of
the centralized system was to "foster efficiency, enhance
competition, increase the information available to brokers, dealers,
and investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors' orders, and
contribute to [the] best execution of such orders." 4 The 1975
Amendments included a continuing obligation to evaluate and
revise market framework and update regulations."
'0 15 U.S.C. § 78(a-ii) (2006).
'' Id. at § 78(b). The purpose of the SEC's rule promulgation is to protect the
national public interest in securities markets, "remov[ing] impediments ...
impos[ing] requirements [and] ... insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest
markets." Id. The Commission was created based upon Congress finding that
exchange of securities across the country and abroad has a great impact on
interstate commerce, the federal tax system, national credit, and the banking
system. Id. This link was found due to the enormous volume of transactions,
the market's susceptibility to manipulation, and the immediate action required
due to the severe impact a national emergency can have on markets, requiring
immediate action. Id.
12 Id.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2006) (stating that since "[t]he securities markets are an
important national asset which must be preserved and strengthened [and] [n]ew
data processing and communications techniques create the opportunity for more
efficient and effective market operations [and] [i]t is in the public interest and
appropriate for the protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and
orderly markets . . . [and] [t]he linking of all markets for qualified securities
through communication and data processing facilities," the creation of a national
market system is in the nation's best interest).
'4 Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(D). Congress explicitly directed the SEC to create and
maintain the national market system. Id. at (a)(2).
" Id. § 78k-l(a)(3)(c) (calling for studies, recommendations, and
modifications to the national market system).
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Second, in 2005 the SEC enacted Regulation National Market
System ("Reg NMS"),'" which was "designed to modernize and
strengthen the regulatory structure of the U.S. Equity Markets" for
the purpose of "achiev[ing] the objectives of efficient, competitive,
fair, and orderly markets that are in the public interest and protect
investors."" With Reg NMS, the SEC revised the national market
system rules due to drastic changes which had occurred since the
1975 Amendments, including the expansive use of advanced
trading technologies.'" One example of the effect of Reg NMS on
market structure was that it enabled the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") to implement automated trading alongside manual
trading, marking the end of a 214-year tradition of trading
exclusively on the "famed floor."" Today, automated trading
comprises the majority of overall market activity.20
With the assistance of the 1975 Amendments, Reg NMS and
other revisions to market framework,"' the "continual evolution of
16 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2005).
'7 Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34.5 18.08, 70 Fed. Reg.
37496, 37497 (Aug. 29, 2005). The key tenet of Reg NMS is top of book
protection. Id. This means that every broker dealer and market center was
required to upgrade its technology so that the best bids and offers were protected
quotes. Id. (introducing the "Order Protection Rule").
s Id. at 37497.
" Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3595 n.6 (citing Pierre Paulden, Keep the
Change, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (December 19, 2006) ("Friday, October 6
[2006], was a momentous day for the New York Stock Exchange. That morning
the [New York Stock Exchange] broke with 214 years of tradition when it began
phasing in a new hybrid market structure that can execute trades electronically,
bypassing face-to-face auctions on its famed floor.").
20 Id. at 3594.
21 For example, in 1998 the SEC adopted the Regulation of Exchanges and
Alternative Trading Systems ("Reg ATS") allowing the rise of electronic
exchanges. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.407.60, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844 (Dec. 22, 1998). The
purpose of the regulation was to revise current market framework to better
accommodate the developments due to rapid technological growth. Id at 70845.
The implementation of Reg ATS led to companies increasing their investments
in the development of technology in order to compete in the newly created
markets. See also Laura Unger, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Comm'n, Speech b' SEC Commissioner: Regulation of U.S. Equity Markets:
Implications Jr Innovation. Competition. & Efficiency' (Mar. 17, 1999),
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technologies for generating, routing, and executing orders ....
[D]ramatically improved the speed, capacity, and sophistication of
the trading functions that are available to market participants."
This rapid development in technology allowed for faster market
data analysis, dispersal, and trade implementation-which led the
SEC to request comment on "market structure issues, including
high frequency trading," in January, 2010.23
Prior to high frequency trading, the SEC faced technology-
generated issues such as program trading24 and front-running.2 5
These trading strategies were considered suspect at the time of
their development, with the former raising issues of increased risk
of market detriment26 and the latter perceived as inconsistent with
the fundamental framework and purposes of the market system.27
Today, these same concerns surround high frequency trading,
naked access, flash orders and co-location.2 ' A brief discussion of
how these issues were handled gives insight into how a regulatory
response should be structured today.
B. Examples of Technology Raising Concerns
Program trading is the "buying and selling of a large number of
stocks . . . simultaneously . . . requir[ing] complex computer
analyses."2 9 Due to "improvements in communications and data
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch260.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (noting that one of the three
principles that guide the SEC's equity market regulations is "promoting the use
of technology to foster competition and innovation" in a speech about the impact
of Reg ATS).
22 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3594.
23 Id. "The review includes an evaluation of equity market structure
performance in recent years and an assessment of whether market structure rules
have kept pace with, among other thing, changes in trading technology and
practices." Id.
24 See infra Part II.B.
25 See id.
26 See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
28 See infra Part I[L.
29 Lewis Solomon, et al., The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy
Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 205 (1988). See also Richard A. Booth, The
Uncertain Case for Regulating Program Trading, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1,
[Vot. 11: 377382
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processing technologies" in the late 1980s, traders were able to
make these large transactions at an increasingly rapid pace."'
Program trading was frequently cited as a major aggravating factor
that led to Black Monday in 1987." The automatic programs
continued to perform large trades based on the occurrence of
triggering events, without human intervention, and without regard
for the unusual circumstance of a rapidly falling market. As a
result, the market drop was accelerated as the programs continued
to react." [n response to these allegations, the SEC, along with the
NYSE, implemented rules "restricting program trading in a falling
market."3 4 These so-called "collars" were set to limit or
completely stop program trading once the market falls by a certain
percentage.3' The quick and decisive regulatory response of both
the SEC and NYSE when presented with somewhat weak evidence
linking program trading to Black Monday" signals a policy of
1-2 (1994) (defining program trading as "the use of computer-aided trading
strategies designed to exploit discrepancies between the prices of various
derivative instruments and the underlying stock.").
30 Solomon, supra note 29, at 205.
31 Id. at 191 ("In the aftermath of the crash of 1987, several studies and
hearings were conducted to investigate its cause . . . . These efforts have
produced conflicting conclusions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the existence of
derivative instruments . . . and the use of program trading strategies contributed
to the market 'break.'"). See also Booth, supra note 29, at 1-2 (1994) ("When
the stock market collapsed in October of 1987 many suspected that the
mysterious practice of 'program trading'. . . was at fault.").
32 Solomon, supra note 29, at 288 ("Program trading affected the depth and
speed of [the 1987 crash]."). This was due to the automated nature of the
programs. Id. When the market began to fall, the programs continued operating
as usual, buying and selling according to normal market conditions. Id.
3 Steven Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes-The Mechanics of Securities
Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 298 (1994).
34 Booth, supra note 29, at 4.
3 Id. at 9.
36 Id. (arguing that program trading was not the cause of Black Monday);
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law,
70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 167 (1991) (noting that while some claim that program
trading increases market volatility, "[o]thers reject this notion, denying the
existence of any causal connection between increased volatility and derivative
investments and claiming that other factors are to blame").
SPRING 2010]1 383
N.C.J.L & TECH. I F3
immediate action when market stability is in question. Further,
later relaxation of the restrictions on the mechanism contributed to
the conclusion that program trading was not at fault. In fact,
today, program trading is widely used and no longer considered a
risk due to enhanced market technology.3"
Front-running is a second technology that raises market
stability concerns. Front-running refers to the strategy of "trading
on the basis of nonpublic market information, regarding impending
market transactions, by broker-dealers or investment advisors."
Part of the concern over front-running was the use of the
mechanism to trade ahead of customer orders. 40  Although this
practice raises issues of creating a two-tiered market and
destroying consumer confidence, it did not lead to any direct
regulation.4 1 Instead, the SEC left it to the individual exchanges to
implement rules as each deemed necessary,42 requesting comments
on the strategy and performing studies on the mechanism's impact
on the markets.4 3 One major reason for the SEC's lack of
immediate reaction was that it found current law could be used to
37 For example, in 1999 the NYSE lessened the restrictive rule adopted to
limit program trading. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock
Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Amendments to Rule 80A, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40141, 64 Fed. Reg. 8424 (Feb. 19, 1999).
31s Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The
Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L.
865, 882 (2007-2008) ("The circuit breakers proved to be unpopular and were
discarded in 2007. .. . They were . . . no longer needed . . . because the NYSE
has massively increased its capacity to deal with large volume trading that might
trigger those limits. In 1987, the NYSE could handle only about 95 electronic
messages per second, but by 2007 it was able to handle 38,000 messages per
second as a result of computer enhancements.").
3 Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A
Breach in Search of a Durt, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 83, 102 (1998).
40 Jerry W. Markham, "Front-Running "-Insider Trading Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 69, 71 (1988).
41 Id. at 127. See also infra Part III.B (discussing flash orders, a modem
version of front-running).
42 Markham, supra note 40, at 83.
41 Id. at 81-92.
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litigate issues arising from the use of front-running, thereby
eliminating the need for new rules.44
Comparing the response to program trading with that of front-
running, it is apparent that a risk of harm due to market instability
is dealt with swiftly, even without conclusive evidence.
Conversely, issues concerning market manipulation and dilution of
market fundamentals are met with a more reasoned and patient
response. This is relevant given the striking similarity between the
issues previously raised concerning program trading and front-
running, and the current controversy concerning high frequency
trading, naked access, flash orders, and co-location.
Ilt. THE CONTROVERSIAL TECHNOLOGY OF MODERN MARKETS
A. High Frequency Trading
Within the national market system, 63.8% of share volume is
executed via registered exchanges including the NASDAQ, NYSE
and Better Alternative Trading System ("BATS").45 Due to the
1975 Amendments and Reg NMS modernizing market framework,
technology has had a major impact on the manner in which trades
are executed on these exchanges." Specifically, registered
exchanges have "adopted highly automated trading systems that
can offer extremely high-speed, or 'low-latency,' order responses
and executions."" This has led to the average response time being
"reduced to less than I millisecond."" The development of this
technology, combined with the exchanges offering "liquidity
rebates,"49 led to the development of high frequency trading.o
44 Id. (pointing to extensive law in the area of market manipulation that could
adapt to form a cause of action for injuries realized due to the new strategy).
45 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3597.
46 id.
47 d
48 Id. (citing BATS Exchange and NASDAQ releases and noting that the
average latency on their exchanges is 320 microseconds and 294 microseconds,
respectively).
49 Id at 3599. Liquidity rebates are given for any "resting orders that offer
(make) liquidity" if executed. Id. On the other hand, orders that take liquidity
are "charged an access fee." Id. The minimum access fee is set by Regulation
N.C.J.L & TECH.
High frequency trading refers to "professional traders acting in a
proprietary capacity"" to use "low-latency system[s]" 2 in running
large numbers of liquidity providing non-marketable orders
electronically, most of which are subsequently cancelled." When
this strategy is used numerous times a day, on a tremendous
number of orders, the liquidity rebates add up to a significant
profit.54
Today, high frequency trading comprises over 50% of market
volume.55 Developing an efficient algorithm which operates with
NMS as 0.3 cents per share. Id. By setting their access fees slightly higher,
exchanges are able to shell out the difference as a liquidity rebate. Id.
50 id.
5I Id. at 3606. See also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing
a similar strategy called front-running in which insiders used non-public
information to trade in their own capacity for profit). Both mechanisms are
viewed to produce a two-tiered market to the detriment of individual and
institutional investors. See supra note 41, 98-99 and accompanying text.
52 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3599. Latency is the delay that occurs in
transmitting buy or sell orders. Jennifer Kwan, Modern Trader's Clock: Micro,
Nano and Picoseconds, REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2009, http://hft.
thomsonreuters.com/2009/1 1/23/hft-factbox/ (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology) (noting that while "[a] fast trader can type and
submit five trades in a minute, high frequency traders will soon be able to do
sixty million trades in the same amount of time); see also Phil Wahba et al.,
Geeks Trump Alpha Males as Algos Dominate Wall Street, REUTERS, Dec. 2,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1641435720091202 (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) ("The essence of algorithmic
trading. . . is to avoid a bad price. Traders get the most control possible .... ).
5 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3607 (discussing the "four broad types of
trading strategies that often are associated with [high frequency trading]-
passive market making, arbitrage, structural, and directional"). The release
further notes that the trading strategies listed "are not new. What is new is the
technology that allows . . . firms to better identify and execute trading
strategies." Id.
54 Id. (noting that "the primary sources of profits are from earning the spread
by buying at the bid and selling at the offer and capturing any liquidity rebates
offered").
5 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3606 (noting that high frequency trading
"is a dominant component of the current market structure and is likely to affect
nearly all aspects of its performance").
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the lowest latency technology can provide is paramount to this
strategy.' As noted in the SEC's Concept Release:
Many proprietary firm strategies are highly dependent upon speed -
speed of market data delivery from trading center serves to serves of
the proprietary firm; speed of decision processing of trading engines of
the proprietary firm; speed of access to trading center serves by servers
of the proprietary firm; and speed of order execution and response by
trading centers. Speed matters both in the absolute sense of achieving
very small latencies and in the relative sense of being faster than
competitors, even if only by a microsecond.57
Awareness and mastery of the variables affecting speed, "such as
distance, traffic load, bandwidth and processing capacity," are
vital," The tools used by high frequency traders to achieve low
latency vary among firms and are rarely disclosed." Lack of
5 See Kwan, supra note 52; see also Citadel Investment Group, LLC. v. Teza
Technologies, LLC, 2009 WL 3416124 (D.I.L. 2009) ("High speed computer
infrastructure is critical to the high frequency business because processing and
execution speed are extremely important to successful high frequency trading.").
In this case, Citadel, an "alternative investments, investment banking, and
technology related products and services" firm alleged that two former
employees "breached their non-compete agreements" when they formed Teza, a
high frequency trading firm. Id. In its court papers, the firm "detailed the
extraordinary steps it takes to protect its software. . . . [These include]
encrypti[on and] ... discourag[ing] employees from writing down details about
them. Its offices have cameras and guards and there are. secure rooms that
require special codes to enter." Alex Berenson, Arrest Over Trading Software
Illuminates a Secret of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at Al.
5 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3610.
Kwan, supra note 52. For an excellent and in depth analysis of the
technology and mathematics involved in algorithm development, see William
Bertram, Analytic Solutions for Optimal Statistical Arbitrage Trading, 398
PHYSICA A: STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS I1, 2234-2243
(June 2010) ("In this paper we derive analytic formulae for statistical arbitrage
trading . . . we derive expressions for the mean and variance of trade length and
return,").
59 The Tabb Group, US Equity High Frequency Trading: Strategies, Sizing
and Market Structure, I (2009), http://hft.thomsonreuters.com/files/2009/1 I/
TABBReuterslnsider-TV-on- H FT-final.doc (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). The Tabb report discusses the frequent
misconception that high frequency traders utilize controversial tools such as
naked access and flash orders, urging that "direct association with each other
should not be assumed without further clarification." Id. However, it also notes
that "the defense of high frequency trading cannot free those firms from
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knowledge and understanding of high frequency trading is
problematic since a disproportionate level of latency among market
participants raises issues concerning superior access, creating a
two-tiered market, and risk management." Three controversial
tools associated with the race to obtain the lowest possible
latency-flash orders,"' naked access, 2 and co-location,"-are
discussed below.
B. Flash Orders
Flash orders allow traders with faster and more expensive data
feeds to learn about trade order information approximately thirty
milliseconds before the general public.' Under Reg NMS,
exchanges are required to disclose all "best bids and offers" to the
public." However, flash orders operate under an exception" to this
rule which allows exchanges to "exclude[] bids and offers
communicated on an exchange that either are executed
immediately after communication or cancelled or withdrawn if not
executed immediately after communication."" This allows the
accepting a degree of blame for the suspicion occasionally leveled against them
[due to being] ... so secretive they make hedge funds look like carnival
barkers."). Id. See also Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3607 (Jan. 21.2010)
(requesting general comments on "the strategies employed by proprietary firms"
including "technology tools and other market structure components").
60 See generallv Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act
Release No. 34.613.58, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (Jan. 21.2010).
61 See infa Part 111.B
See infra Part IlIl.C
61See infa Part Ill.D
64 Duhigg, supra note 3. For example, if an order is put into a mutual fund at
9:31 A.M., a high frequency trader who receives flash orders would get a
preview of that order and be able to execute an order for all available shares of
the stock before the mutual fund is able to execute the order submitted by the
investor. Id.
65 Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.606.84, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632, 48632 (Sept. 23,
2009).
6 "The exception was intended to facilitate manual trading in the crowd on
exchange floors by excluding quotations that then were considered 'ephemeral'
and impractical to include in the consolidated quotation data." Id.
67 Id. See also Sal L. Arnuk & Joseph Saluzzi, What Ails Us About High
FrequencY Trading, THEMIs TRADING (2009), http://www.themistrading
388 [Vot. 11: 377
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exchanges to display the flash orders only to members of the
particular exchange, or in some cases, just to members of the
particular exchange who pay a fee to receive the information."
Further, since the orders only exist for a number of milliseconds,
the only investors capable of making use of the flashes are those
who have invested significantly in technology." This is because
once these investors are flashed the order information, they must
"respond with their own order to execute against the flashed order
... [and] only market participants with pre-programmed systems
capable of responding very rapidly" are capable of successfully
responding."o Therefore, the availability of flash orders raises
issues of enhanced access creating a two-tiered market and
improper information dissemination." This is mainly because
traders who receive the order information before the public
markets or general public use the information to trade ahead of the
signaled orders.12
C. Naked Access
Exchange members are called broker-dealers, and they have
exclusive access to their respective markets through market
.com/article_files/0000/0508/WhatAils UsAboutHighFrequency Trading
-- _Final 2_10-5-09.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (analogizing flash orders with overhearing trades before they hit
the tape on the old exchange floor).
6s Charles Duhigg, S.E.C. Starts Crackdown on "Flash" Trading, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2009, at BI available at http://www.nytimes.con/2009/08/05/business
/05flash.html (noting that the practice is unfair, even when the market charges a
fee, since only those with the technology to act on data within milliseconds
stand to gain).
69 Id.
7o Elimination of Flash Order Exception From Rule 602 of Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.606.84, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632, 48634 (Sept. 23,
2009).
' Id. See also Charles Duhigg, Senator Wants Restrictions on High-Speed
Trading, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at B6, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2009/07/25/business/25trading.htmi (claiming that this is a
loophole that attacks the fundamental transparency of markets by not showing
trade orders to everyone simultaneously).
72 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 39-44 and
accompanying text (discussing front-running).
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participant identifiers ("MPIDs"). However, customers can
borrow broker-dealer MPIDs to gain access to markets." As
opposed to "direct market access," in which "the customer's orders
flow through the broker-dealer's systems before passing into the
markets," and "sponsored access," in which "the customer's orders
flow directly into the markets without first passing through the
broker-dealer's systems," but still go through pre-trade filters,
naked access refers to a "subset of sponsored access where pre-
trade filters ... are not applied to orders before such orders are
submitted to an exchange."" Therefore, naked access allows the
customer to bypass both the broker-dealer's pre-trade filters and
the pass through review. This practice decreases latency, allows
traders to operate anonymously, and enables them to participate
without obtaining costly membership to exchanges." Therefore,
naked access "reduce[s] latencies and facilitate[s] more rapid
trading . . . preserv[ing] the confidentiality of sophisticated,
proprietary trading strategies, and reduc[ing] trading costs by
lowering operational costs, commissions, and exchange fees." 7 At
the same time, the mechanism raises issues of risk management,
calling the "integrity of the broker-dealer, the markets, and the
financial system" into question."
D. Co-Location
Basic physics dictates that time equals distance divided by
speed. Therefore, as distance decreases so does time. Co-location
refers to the "service offered by trading centers . . . [which] rent
1 Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers With Market Access,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.613.79, 75 Fed. Reg. 4007, 4008 (Jan. 26, 2010)
[hereinafter Risk Management Controls].
74Id.
75Id.
76 Id. ("Certain market participants may find the wide range of access
arrangements beneficial . .. . [because they] may reduce latencies and facilitate
more rapid trading . .
" Id. n.7.
7 Id. at 4008 ("[O]rder placement rates can exceed 1,000 orders per second
with the use of high-speed, automated algorithms," and pointing out that if one
of the programs malfunctioned, there would be no pre-trade risk assessment to
catch the error). Id. at 4009.
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rack space to market participants that enables them to place their
servers in close physical proximity to a trading center's matching
engine."" Placing their computers as physically close to the
exchange servers as possible allows traders to decrease latency.
However, only those market participants who heavily invest in
technology are able to take advantage of the millisecond gain,
raising issues of enhanced market access and creation of a two-
tiered market framework."o
IV. LEGAL [SSUES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
The two main issues associated with high frequency trading are
increased risk of market instability and detriment to the
fundamental values of the market system.
A. Risk of Market Instability
Historically, the SEC has reacted to known threats to market
stability swiftly, aiming to mitigate the perceived harm through the
use of safety mechanisms." Although the Commission's reaction
to general fears concerning high frequency trading was passive,"
the SEC acted without hesitation with respect to naked access."
As a general matter, high frequency trading strategies could
lead to significant market-wide harm. 4 For example, since trading
is automated, and based on programs that analyze market data and
act on pre-set triggers, it is possible for several programs to come
to the same conclusion simultaneously, leading to tremendous
market volatility." This perceived harm, however, is based on
7 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3610.
8o Duhigg, supra note 68.
sI See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (discussing program
trading).
82 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (introducing the SEC's
Concept Release).
1 Risk Management Controls, supra note 73.
so Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3611 (asking whether "the high speed and
enormous message traffic of automated trading systems threaten the integrity of
trading center operations . ... [or] lead to more widespread financial distress").
85 Id. ("[M]any proprietary firms potentially could engage in similar or
connected trading strategies that, in such strategies generated significant losses
SPRING 20101 391
N.C.J.L & TCH. 1-: C 3
speculation. Further, most high frequency firms are "flat" at the
end of the day, which mean that they have no overnight risk."
This too makes the strategy less susceptible to causing major
market meltdown. Consequently, although the SEC has
acknowledged the general risk of high frequency trading increasing
market volatility, it also noted that "the equity markets performed
well during the worldwide financial crises in the Autumn of 2008
when volume and volatility spiked to record highs,""' and did not
propose a rule to deal with the anticipated negative effect."
Conversely, risks associated with the use of naked access in
conjunction with high frequency trading are seen as more
imminently threatening. The problems associated with permitting
traders to bypass all risk management review prior to trade
execution is intensified by the speed and volume of trades which
take place utilizing high frequency trading." The immediate and
probable nature of this harm led the SEC to propose a rule"
prohibiting any type of sponsored access in which the customer is
able to bypass pre-trade filters,"' effectively banning naked access
in January 2010.2 The SEC's proposed Rule 15c3-5 notes four
at the same time, could cause many proprietary firms to become financially
distressed and lead to large fluctuations in market price.").
16 The Tabb Group, supra note 59 (noting that "the majority of HFT strategies
attempt to be market-neutral or closed out by the end of each day").
'1 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3611 (suggesting that the added liquidity
supplied by high frequency trading offset any negative effects of increased
volatility).
" In comparison, the SEC has proposed a rule to ban both naked access and
flash orders. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing proposed ban
on naked access); infra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing proposed
ban on flash orders).
' Risk Management Controls, supra note 73, at 4007.
90 "Proposed Rule 15c3-5 would require a broker or dealer that has market
access, or that provides a customer or any other person with access to an
exchange or ATS through use of its MPID or otherwise, to establish, document,
and maintain a system of risk management controls and supervisory procedures
reasonably designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks, such as
legal and operational risks, related to such market access." Id. at 4011.
9Id. at 4009.
92 Id. at 4008 n.4. "It has been reported that 'unfiltered access accounts for an
estimated 38 perfect of the average daily volume on the U.S. stock market.'" Id.
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risks that can be avoided with simple risk management controls:
"potential breach of a credit or capital limit, the submission of
erroneous orders as a result of computer malfunction or human
error, the failure to comply with SEC or exchange trading rules,
[and] the failure to detect illegal conduct."" Further, when naked
access is used together with high frequency trading, "the potential
impact of a trading error or a rapid series of errors . . . [is] more
severe,"94 and places the burden on the broker-dealers rather than
the customers borrowing their MPIDs." The proposal also
includes an interest in uniformity since the rule will be in effect for
all exchanges, rather than leaving the establishment of a rule to the
discretion of each exchange.96 The desire for consistency here, in
contrast to co-location, about which the SEC allows each exchange
to develop its own policy, signifies greater interest in protecting
market stability versus traditional market framework.
The SEC's response to the risks associated with naked access is
in line with the SEC's reaction to program trading after Black
Monday in 1987." Perceiving a risk of potential market
destruction, the SEC is proposing a safety feature, mandatory risk
management, which it believes will mitigate the potential harm. In
light of the current economic downturn, it is not surprising that risk
management is a high priority.
B. Detriment to Market Fundamentals
at n. 10 (citing Scott Patterson, Big Slice of Market is Going "Naked, " WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2009)).
93 Risk Management Controls, supra note 73, at 4011. "Incidents involving
algorithmic or other trading errors in connection with market access occur with
some regularity." Id. at 4009.
94id.
95Id.
96 Id. at 4010 (noting that "establishing a single set of broker-dealer
obligations ... would provide uniform standards that would be interpreted and
enforced in a consistent manner").
9 See Booth, supra note 29, at 9 (discussing the reaction to program trading
during which "markets instituted a system of circuit breakers that would, in the
event of dramatic price movements, (I) limit access to computerized execution
of stock trades for program trading purposes, and (2) would limit or half trading
in the stock and futures markets for short periods").
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High frequency trading and the associated tools most threaten
two market fundamentals: traditional long-term investor primacy"
and the maintenance of a one-tiered market framework." Despite
these threats to the traditional structure, the SEC has not taken
direct action against high frequency trading and co-location.
However, the Commission has acted to propose the elimination of
flash orders because, beyond enhanced access, the tool has the
potential to aid in market manipulation.'00
High frequency trading is at odds with the traditional purpose
of securities regulations which is the primary protection of long-
term investors."" For example, when using the strategy to obtain
tenths or hundredths of a penny liquidity rebates on each of
millions of trades, high frequency traders are not concerned with
the long-term value of the investments they make."02 In fact, in the
See Concept Release, supra note 4. See also Regulation NMS, Exchange
Act Release no. 34.5 18.08, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496, 37501 (June 29, 2005) ("In the
years since 1934, the priority placed by Congress on the interests of long-term
investors has grown more and more significant.").
9 In the spirit of fair markets, the SEC seeks to maintain a level playing field
in which all information is equally accessible to all market participants. See
supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. For example, the SEC is concerned
about flash orders because they "could lead to a two-tiered market in which the
public does not have access . . . to information about the best available prices for
U.S.-listed securities that is available to some market participants through
proprietary data feeds." Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of
Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34.606.84, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632,
48633 (Sept. 23, 2009).
'00 Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.606.84, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632, 48637 (Sept. 23,
2009) (noting that there is a "risk that recipients of the information could act in
ways that disadvantage the flashed order . . . those market participants with the
fastest systems are able to react to information in a shorter time frame than the
length of the flash order exposures").
"o' See supra notes 4, 98. See also Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release
No. 34.518.08, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496, 37500 (Aug. 29, 2005) ("[Wlhen the
interests of long-term investors and short-term traders conflict, the Commission
believes that its clear responsibility is to uphold the interests of long-term
investors. Indeed, the core concern for the welfare of long-term investors ...
was first expressed in the foundation documents of the Exchange Act itself.").
102 Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3608 (questioning whether high
frequency firms employing "passive market making strategies" for the sole
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majority of cases, high frequency traders cancel orders prior to
execution."" Although "the interests of investors and professional
traders may at times be aligned""o and evidence suggests that high
frequency trading increases liquidity and narrows spreads,'
volatility created due to the large orders bought and sold at a rapid
pace may lead to long-term investor detriment.""o
Besides strategy focused on short-term gains, high frequency
trading contributes to traditional investor confusion and decreased
confidence due to secrecy surrounding the technology."'
Moreover, with the incidence of high frequency trading continuing
to increase, the face of the actual traders is also changing from
"alpha male" types who found success on the old trading floor to
PhDs in computer science."' In fact, individual exchanges have
noticed the increased prevalence of high frequency trading and
have developed options to entice the speedy traders, such as flash
orders and co-location."" In fact, Luise's former place of business,
the NYSE, recently opened a state of the art data center in
Mahwah, New Jersey, for the purpose of courting the high
purpose of gaining liquidity rebates operate to the detriment of long-term
investors).
"' Id. at 3599 (noting that high frequency trading firms "often cancel[] a very
high percentage" of their orders).
'' Id. at 3603.
105 Id.
06 Id.
107 See Kaufman, supra note 3 (noting that "high frequency trading strategies"
can cause the "average investor to lose[] confidence in the integrity of our
markets"); Duhigg, supra note 3, at A17 ("High-frequency traders often
confound other investors by issuing and then canceling orders almost
simultaneously.").
1os Wahba, supra note 52 (noting that "[wihile street smarts and an ability to
socialize were crucial to successful floor traders, today's trader needs math and
computer science, and quite possibly a PhD"). The article goes on to discuss
how "[tlraditional floor trading 'really is an alpha male activity' . . . . It's like
being in a locker room. In contrast, computer programmers are almost like a
think tank . . . . They are introverts, some are socially awkward, and they don't
seek publicity. They are the type of guys you would see at a Star Wars
convention." Id.
'
09See Duhigg, supra note 3, at Al7 ("High-frequency traders also benefit
from competition among the various exchanges.").
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frequency trading community.'" Despite voicing concern with the
movement, the SEC has reacted mildly with simple requests for
comment and further study, similar to its position on front-running.
Whereas detriment to long-term investors is threatened through
the general use of high frequency trading strategies, the risk of
creating a two-tiered market is frequently cited as the principal
complaint associated with flash orders,'" co-location," 2 and high
frequency trading." 3  On its own, high frequency trading raises
issues of a two-tiered market system because the sophisticated
technology employed by the traders is not universally available." 4
Questions arise regarding the possibility that traditional investors
will be forced to invest in the technology in order to remain viable,
and whether the current market structure allows for both types of
trading to occur simultaneously on the same exchanges, without
o See Scott Patterson & Serena Ng, NYSE's Fast-Trade Hub Rises Up in
New Jersev, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2009, at Cl.
'''"The flashing of order information could lead to a two-tiered market in
which the public does not have access . . . to information about the best available
prices . . . that is available to some market participants through proprietary data
feeds." Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation
NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34.606.84, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632, 48633 (Sept.
23, 2009). See also supra Part IlI.B.
112 See Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3610 (questioning the "fairness of
Co-location Services"). For example, the Commission asks whether some
market participants have superior access due to their heavy investment in
technology. Id. See also supra Part Ill.D.
l1 Duhigg, supra note 71 (quoting Senator Schumer's view of high frequency
trading: "The hallmark of our markets are that they are open and above board
and the little guys has as much of a chance as the big guy. . . . This takes a
dagger to the heart of that concept.").
114 For example, firms must invest significant sums of money into developing
high frequency trading programs. In a lawsuit against a former Goldman Sachs
employee who is charged with stealing "32 megabytes of Goldman proprietary
code, a small fraction of the overall programs, which is 1,224 megabytes," US
prosecutor, Joseph Facciponti, notes that "[t]he bank itself stands to lose its
entire investment in creating this software . . . which is millions upon millions of
dollars." Alex Berenson, Arrest Over Trading Software Il/uminates a Secret of
Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at Al (noting that Citadel paid "tens of
millions to two top programmers in the last seven years").
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detriment to traditional investors." More complex concerns arise
when high frequency trading is evaluated alongside co-location or
flash orders."6 Both tools allow high frequency traders to increase
the efficiency and speed of their transactions." However, since
both tools are useful only to traders who have already invested in
technology to such an extent that microseconds make a significant
difference, the existence of these options is evidence of exchanges
favoring a certain faction of traders.'"
As noted earlier, with respect to high frequency trading, the
SEC has not taken any action beyond requesting comments and
suggestions regarding possible future regulation."9 The same is
true of co-location.' 20 However, on September 18, 2009, the SEC
proposed the "Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule
602 of Regulation NMS" in order to remedy the unfair discrepancy
in market information disclosure based on technological
capability.' 2 ' This was due to concerns of a two-tiered market in
which one tier was obtaining the benefit of enhanced information
due to superior market access.' 22  Compared to high frequency
trading and co-location, which simply amplify a trader's speed,
flash orders present a direct threat of misuse and market
manipulation.123
1' See, e.g., Concept Release, supra note 4, at 3605 (questioning if it is
"unfair for market participants to obtain a competitive advantage by investing in
technology and human resources that enable them to trade more effectively and
profitably than others").
11 See supra Parts 111.1, Ill.D (discussing how flash orders and co-location
enhance market access for some participants).
" Id.
18 Id.
"9 See general/v Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act
Release No. 34.613.58, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594.120 Id.
12 Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.606.84, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632 (Sept. 23, 2009).
122 Id. at 48636.
2 Id. at 48637 ("[Tlhe flashing of orders to many market participants creates
a risk that recipients of the information could act in ways that disadvantage the
flashed order."). See also Duhigg, supra note 71 (noting that flash orders could
be used to "trade ahead of other market participants, pushing prices up or
down").
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Presented with concerns of the dilution of market framework
fundamentals, it appears that the SEC has taken a more reasoned
and patient approach to imposing regulations than when confronted
with risks to market stability.'24  Comparable to front-running,
when faced with general fears of injuring long-term investors or
providing a certain class of traders with enhanced access, the SEC
sought comments and requested more information on the effects of
this new phenomenon.125  However, because orders go a step
beyond adding to trader's low latency and add the potential for
misuse and manipulation, 2 1 the SEC used its authority to respond
with regulation designed to mitigate the potential for harm. 2 1
V. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
The SEC should finalize the proposals to ban naked access and
flash orders but continue to seek information and comments
regarding high frequency trading. These regulatory responses
illustrate a policy of immediately protecting against probable risk
of market detriment and manipulation, while allowing seemingly
benign uses of enhanced technology to operate unfettered as more
extensive reporting is done on the effects of the strategies and
tools.
The case for immediate reaction to potential market risk is
simple. A policy of quick regulation, rather than waiting and
watching to see if the harm will in fact materialize, is more sound.
Further, a policy of limiting the use of mechanisms that may
foreseeably foster market manipulation is also prudent. While the
ban on flash orders comes five years after the implementation of
Reg NMS and the exception of Rule 602, only recently did the
124 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (showing that the SEC
responded with an immediate proposal to ban naked access, but only a concept
release for suggestions and more information when confronted with HFT and
co-location). This was also exhibited supra Part II.B (comparing the response to
front-running versus program trading).
25 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No.
34.613.58, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (seeking comment on high frequency trading).
126 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
127 Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34.606.84, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632 (Sept. 23, 2009).
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potential for misuse come to light.'2 ' Therefore, with respect to
these two harms, the SEC's quick response was warranted, and the
policy of continuing to react swiftly to similar threats should be
maintained.
Moreover, the SEC's practice of carefully studying the effects
of high frequency trading and co-location, before implementing
any type of regulation, is also reasonable. In comparison to flash
orders, which give technologically advanced market participants
the ability to obtain information unavailable to other participants,
co-location and high frequency trading only promote faster and
more efficient transactions. By way of analogy, in the sports
world, flash orders and naked access would be similar to
performance enhancing drugs. Steroids give athletes a competitive
edge, but in so doing, they threaten to harm the integrity of their
sports, other participants, and potentially, even themselves.'29
Similarly, through enhanced market access to improper
information dispersal, flash orders and naked access increase the
risk of market manipulation and instability to the detriment of all
market participants." 0 Comparatively, as opposed to steroids, co-
location and high frequency trading would parallel new training
techniques discovered after investing in extensive sports science
and nutrition studies. These methods of obtaining a competitive
edge should not be second-guessed merely because traditional
traders do not know of the techniques or have not invested in
researching the disciplines.
The policy of extensively evaluating the effects of new
technology prior to instituting regulations should be continued,
12 Id. at 48632 ("The Securities and Exchange Commission . . . is concerned
that the exception for flash orders . .. which originated in the context of manual
trading floors for quotations that were considered 'ephemeral,' is no longer
necessary or appropriate in today's highly automated trading environment.").
29 See, e.g., Jim Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics,
I MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 93, 94 (1990-1991) ("The introduction of performance-
enhancing drugs has threatened both the integrity of the Olympic Games, and
professional sports in general.").
130 See supra notes 89, 111, and 122 and accompanying text (explaining how
naked access allows direct market access without risk management controls, and
flash orders allow some market participants with market information not
available to other participants).
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even if studies show that the emerging tools and strategies are
changing the fundamental framework of the market system. In
fact, whenever technology develops in other fields, creating more
efficient mechanisms to complete tasks, regulations banning the
inventions are rarely pondered.'"' For example, the idea of banning
the online use of LexisNexis and Westlaw because of the detriment
associated with moving away from traditional texts was never
seriously considered. In short, technology should not be stifled
just to pander to traditionalists. This is not the way our society has
behaved in other fields, and should not be the way our markets
react today.
V[. CONCLUSION
Technology's impact on the financial markets continues to
increase as traders develop complex strategies and tools. High
frequency trading, flash orders, naked access, and co-location are
the most recent mechanisms being evaluated by the SEC and all
other interested parties. While naked access threatens market
stability and flash orders have the potential to lead to market
manipulation, high frequency trading and co-location, on their
own, seem merely to raise concerns of changing traditional market
framework. Therefore, whereas it is necessary to act swiftly to
eliminate naked access and flash orders, even without conclusive
evidence of their negative effects, it is not necessary to act
decisively with respect to high frequency trading and co-location.
131 For example, the automobile was not dismissed in favor of the horse and
buggy, light bulbs easily replaced candles, and email is quickly diminishing the
use of postal service.
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